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Purses or: How the fighters get paid

By Tomer Chen | February 4, 2007

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By: Tomer Chen

One of the biggest topics of discussion throughout the hardcore MMA fan base tends to be the topic of ‘How much did _________ get paid for his last fight?’. After all, as a sports fan, one wants to imagine the glory and the riches that sports players and fighters receive for doing activities that a (relatively) select group of people are capable of doing. In combat sports, since the Roaring ’20s era of Boxing, there has been the desire of fighters to get the $1,000,000 purse in order to say that they are millionaires in their profession of pounding others into submission and to exemplify that as champions (or top challengers) that they really are as successful out of the ring as they are in it. Naturally, of course, the big question that arises out of seeing the fighters’ salaries (such as UFN 8’s fighter salaries) is: how can a pathetically small $3,000 purse for a brutal KO loss in a main event (for Sean Salmon) or a $6,000 purse for a heavily hyped fighter (Heath Herring) be justified in the world of MMA, especially given the massive buyrates and gates that UFC itself has been drawing in the last year or so? There are a number of non cash factors that often play into the thinking of fighters with regards to accepted less money in order to get onto the big stage. Tommy Gibbons fighting Jack Dempsey is one such extreme example where a fighter was even willing not to get paid at all in order to fight for the Heavyweight championship (and the glory that came with it).

First, one needs to consider the pure economics of the matter. Technically speaking, the fighter market is similar to any other job market in that there is a supply side (fighters) and a demand side (promoters) who are trying to find an equilibrium salary to go ahead and make the fight. Of course, unlike unskilled labor (which generally has a wage level that is pretty much fixed besides years of experience in the field), fighting is considered a more skilled profession (due to the extensive teaching of the martial art(s) involved in order to succeed in the industry), with a combination of the success rate in the ring/cage as well as other intangibles such as pure skill, charisma and overall drawing power being additional determinants into the equation. The promoters, from a purely economic standpoint, are trying to negotiate a contract rate for the fighters that, at most, will be equal to the expected benefits that the fighter should bring to the organization (quality opponent, drawing ability and so forth). Of course, in the promotional business (and really any business) the goal isn’t simply to get the fighter to agree to the breakeven point, but to maximize ones’ own profits. After all, if you can convince a fighter to accept $3,000 instead of having to pay $10,000, wouldn’t you be saving $7,000 in salary expenses? Hence, there is always a level of negotiations present with the promoter trying to lowball the fighter and the fighter will usually ask for a higher base, so eventually they will meet somewhere around the middle (at a point that both the promoter and the fighter will think is reason – their equilibrium point).   

Another issue to consider, along with the economic basics is the social responsibility of promoters to do what is best for the fighters. After all, in most ‘big’ corporations, it is expected that even the most penny pinching owner will offer services such as 401k retirement plans and health insurance to their skilled employees (unskilled employees are generally not offered the same benefits). Legendary economist Milton Friedman, however, stated the primary purpose of a business is to maximize the wealth of the owners of the business (whether they are shareholders in a publicly traded corporation or a sole proprietor), with deception and fraud prevention being the only socially responsible goals that they should be obligated to follow. In the case of combat sports, however, the state athletic commissions have required insurance coverage for the combatants on the part of the promoters in order to ensure that the purse of a fighter is not spent only on hospital bills, thus leaving them penniless or even in debt. There is no real 401k program in combat sports such as Boxing and MMA, however, so many fighters who are not as fiscally responsible with their funds tend to end up broke at the end of their careers, often fighting way past the point that they should be and ended up physically (and sometimes mentally) broken down during their twilight years (if they’re ‘lucky’ enough to live that long).

Another reason to consider when seeing an eye opening salary for a fighter is the amount of sponsors a fighter may have. For example, Chuck Liddell and Rich Franklin are examples of heavy sponsorship, in this case by Xyience. The sponsor will traditionally pay a fighter to place an advertisement on the trunks in order to (i) associate a winning fighter with a ‘winning brand’ and (ii) to get advertising during a fight when the camera zooms over the advertisement. Certain fighters of ethnicity may also be the targets of sponsors in order to try and reach out certain ethnic markets, as well. In addition, fighters often thank advertisers after winning a bout, giving them another shot in the arm. The contracts are generally given by smaller businesses for fighters on the rise while the big contracts typically will go for the establish stars who will bring a lot of viewers to watch him (and the advertisement as a result). As such, there is a (potential) supplementary income for the fighters in addition to their base purse (which, in the case of the UFC is the win, lose or draw standard rate and a bonus for winning, which usually is doubling the standard rate, but at higher pay levels, may be as low as 50% of the rate). Of course, a fighter who either fails to excite the fans win or lose (unlike an Arturo Gatti-style fighter)  or constantly loses without any real form of charisma will most likely not have a serious sponsor as an option (or will lose the sponsor very quickly).

Another type of compensation that fighters receive is the brand name association of the product (especially in the case of the UFC). Just like in Pro Wrestling where a worker can command a higher salary by having “WWE Veteran” attached to his fighting resume, “UFC Veteran” or “PRIDE Veteran” can give fighters a similar opportunity to command higher than average pay in smaller organizations. In addition, if the fighters are particularly successful in the ‘big leagues’, they may get more fight offers and as many of the smaller leagues do not have exclusivity clauses in their contracts (as most can’t afford to lock up fighters like in UFC, PRIDE, HERO*S and IFL), it is likely that a fighter can make some good money (even more potentially than in the UFC or PRIDE) fighting constantly in the smaller leagues. A Travis Fulton may potentially make more fighting 15+ times a year in MMA (and in Boxing) in various states where medical suspensions are not enforced and get more money than he would in the UFC (though in Fulton’s case he’s probably not making a ton of money each time as he often fights the same guy numerous times and tends to heavily pad his record when he does ‘step up’ and more often than not loses to the bigger name fighter). Nonetheless, a particularly successful star from UFC or PRIDE probably can command a pretty penny on the independent fighting circuit due to the name value he has attached.

Continuing on with this idea is the importance of TV/PPV spotlighting. TV exposure of a fighter is one of the most important ways to spread their own name value to fans. Sure, a fighter can build a hardcore fan base by having great ‘house show’ performances, but would an Arturo Gatti really have sold out the Boardwalk Hall numerous times if the Rodriguez, Ruelas, Ward & Robinson fights were non taped? It’s highly doubtful, especially since the profit base in Boxing changed with the advent of television from live gates to TV ratings and later PPV buyrates. Over time, many fans have slipped away from the live event picture, preferring to watch the combat sports product at home unless there is a huge, can’t miss fight or fighter. This fighter, of course, had to be hyped heavily both on TV and the in the mainstream press (such as in the cases of Ali, Leonard, Tyson & De La Hoya). With television, you could advertise yourself beyond the realm of word of mouth (and newspapers) as well as the occasional fight film that was made for theater release. A particularly eye catching fighter such as an Ali, Leonard, De La Hoya or Tyson who either had the gift of gab or true skills (or both) could set himself apart and make himself an icon to the public in his time. In MMA, this is true as well given the build up of Randy Couture as an icon by coming down in weight to Light Heavyweight at a time when most fighters in combat sports were either retired or shot beyond belief and defeated the big three of the division at the time (Liddell, Ortiz & Belfort) to have his last 2 title reigns (barring his potential win over Tim Sylvia at UFC 68). Chuck Liddell has also been built up as a bad ass-style champion, dominating the current Light Heavyweight division, beating Couture twice, Jeremy Horn, Tito Ortiz (again) and Renato Sobral (again) in winning and defending his belt. He’s also been involved in 5 out of 6 of the biggest drawing MMA gates in Nevada (as seen here) and (supposedly) helped draw by far the biggest drawing buyrate in MMA history to date with his rematch against Tito Ortiz at UFC 66, allegedly getting over 1,000,000 buys according to Dave Meltzer of the WON (amongst other sources).

Does this mean that every fighter who gets on TV will actually benefit from the exposure? Certainly not, as a fighter who is not particularly charismatic out of the ring or cage will have to prove his worth in it and if he a plodding fighter who enjoys getting the “W” in the books instead of providing the best contest possible (examples of this would be current UFC Heavyweight Champion Tim Sylvia and Ricardo Arona), he may get the recognition from the press and hardcore fans as a quality fighter, but he will also be associated as being boring and not worthy of watching for fear of a snoozer. Even fighters who are not particularly amazing in terms of in ring excitement can still be large drawing cards if they can cut promos and build up fights to be epic battles (such as in Tito Ortiz’ case). And, of course, there are fighters like Arturo Gatti who will sell out venues like the Boardwalk Hall even in losing because of their fighting style and spirit (and the fans know they will get their money’s worth). The idealistic fighter for pretty much all fans is one who both carries excitement and charisma to the sport, but they will be willing to let go of the excitement variable if he can give good promos and know how to build himself up.

Another variable, although it probably does not exist anymore due to the (comparatively) heavy regulation in both Boxing and MMA, is the potential for getting a special bonus for doing a tank job (or, in other words, a dive). While in MMA the accusations of fixed bouts was primarily in Japan (during the early PRIDE events with Nobuhiko Takada’s wins and some other bouts such as Nathan Jones vs. Koji Kitao), the one major accusation in the US comes from the Don Frye-Mark Hall III bout, as Hall has claimed in the past (detailed in No Holds Barred: Ultimate Fighting and the Martial Arts Revolution by Clyde Gentry) that Robert DePersia, a lawyer who managed both Frye and Hall told him to take a dive for a bonus and future fight opportunities (supposedly with Frye encouraging the dive after DePersia threatened to blackball Hall). Hall claims he took a dive, tapping out a heel hook in about 20 seconds to allow Frye to not be tired for the finals of the Ultimate Ultimate ’96 against ‘Tank’ Abbott. Hall then reported his claim to Gentry (amongst others), supposedly because DePersia (and Frye) shortchanged him and denied that they ever told him to take a dive. Of course, the circumstances of the bout (such as two stable mates under one manager fighting each other) would probably be banned under today’s MMA scene by the athletic commissions (just like it is in Boxing), given the inherent issues it brings up. Nonetheless, this darker side of the fight business as a whole (given that Boxing had severe issues for many years with dives) is one other way that a fighter could make some extra cash or a better opportunity (such as Jake LaMotta getting a World Middleweight Championship title shot against Marcel Cerdan for taking a dive against Billy Fox for the Mafia), even though it is illegal.

A quick discussion of the UFC payment structure is as follows: There is a base purse given to a fighter, win, lose or draw. If a fighter wins, he will get a win bonus purse (often the same as the main purse, but at larger purses, can be around 50% of the original purse). There is also KO and Submission of the night prizes given out to fighters as a way to try and encourage a fight to the finish. Finally, the main eventers (or in some cases, co-main eventers) will split a percentage of the PPV buyrates in additional to their main purse. This bonus is nothing new, as Boxing had gate percentages for years. So, as it can be seen, there are a number of factors in addition to what is officially listed as a purse that can inflate what the final cash purse will be (although only the award is really available for the whole roster to potentially get). 

With these additional factors that can inflate what the fighter truly is making, the next question that probably should be asked is: Even if a fighter is getting more than what the initial glance shows from both physical cash and intangible recognition, isn’t it possible that the promoters are still undercutting the fighters? And to this, I would simply say: yes. After all, the promoter is in business for only one person: himself. And there are countless historical examples of promoters using purses and using contracts in order to maximize their profitability to the detriment of their fighters.

Probably the most well known example of a promoter hurting his fighters through using highly questionable (if not illegal) contracts and basically coercing them to join him would be Don King. As seen in The Life and Crimes of Don King: The shame of Boxing in America by Jack Newfield (a book that I highly endorse as one of the best stories of the promoter’s side I’ve ever read), Mr. King was rather ingenious with his contract practices. One of the most detailed examples of his complex manipulations and financial abuse of his fighters would be the sad story of Tim Witherspoon (highlighted in detail in Chapter 11: Tim Witherspoon and the Lost Generation of Heavyweights).

The brief version of the story is: Don King bought out Mark Stewart (Witherspoon’s old manager), then had Witherspoon banned from fighting by the Cleveland Boxing commission (who were apparently in King’s pocket) as Witherspoon wanted to pull out of a fight against James ‘Quick’ Tillis because he had developed a serious ear infection that his physician had informed him not to fight on. King essentially starved out Witherspoon and forced him to sign 4 contracts without any legal counsel present under threat of a lifetime blacklist from Boxing (which legally probably could have been considered duress as well as predatory behavior): (i) Don King was Witherspoon’s exclusive promoter (which he wanted), (ii) Carl King (Don’s stepson) was entitled to a 33 1/3% cut of Witherspoon’s earnings as manager (which was the legal limit on manager cuts imposed by the state athletic commissions to try and end essential slavery of fighters like Primo Carnera who got virtually nothing from Mafia-run managers and promoters during his career), (iii) a contract that listed a 50% cut (the enforced contract that technically would have been thrown out of court if they tried to enforce it) and (iv) a blank contract that Don could essentially write in anything with Tim’s signature on it. While contract (i) was acceptable to Tim himself and contract (ii) was forced but not horrendous on its own (since Tim probably would have had to pay around that much for any manager worth his grain in salt), contracts (iii) and (iv) and the fact that Carl King was essentially Don King acting through a public agent (similar in practice to Al Weill using a public agent to manage Rocky Marciano in the early 50s while he was matchmaker for the IBC due to the conflict of interest it presented) were pretty damning items against Witherspoon having a fair shake. Eventually, Tim Witherspoon would be able to sue King for lost funds and was able to get a $1 million settlement out of King (a rather hefty sum considering he managed to get an apparently out of it Muhammad Ali who was in the hospital to sign a release on a pending lawsuit for $1.1 million for $50,000 in cash, which was King’s practice – he always believed that fighters were willing to accept $10,000 in cash for $1 million in a check), but squandered it all quickly.

Of course, in the context of the UFC and really MMA as a whole, there isn’t as easy a merger of promoter and manager functions as exemplified above. The UFC, for example, is owned by Zuffa LLC, a privately owned company run by Station Casinos owners Frank and Lorenzo Fertitta with a minor ownership stake by UFC President, Dana White. The Fertitta brothers would not likely be pleased with a potential situation like the above because (i) they have a publicly traded company in Station Casinos that is their bigger overall cash cow venture and (ii) they would be scrutinized more than Don King was (which actually was a fair deal given the number of trials and investigations King faced through his career as a fight promoter) and could potential lose their gaming licenses and go to jail for essentially committing restriction of trade practices. While King was and still is a Boxing promoter who did some music concerts as well early on in his career, the Fertittas are involved in two industries, with the comparatively smaller one being MMA. King’s entire business was Boxing and so he felt he had to get in money from any corner he possibly could (and given that Boxing as a whole is a relatively poor run sport from the aspect of manager and promoter influence, it wasn’t very hard for him to get away with it for years).

Another element of Don King’s business practices involved signing options for future fights into his contracts. One of the most notable examples would be Don King confirming with Donald Trump at the Mike Tyson-James ‘Buster’ Douglas fight that he held options on both fighters. The conversation, as taken from The Life and Crimes of Don King is:

At one point Trump said to King, “You have options on both guys. You can’t lose.”

“That’s right, I can’t lose tonight,” King replied. 

Simply put, Trump (who had quite a few King cards run in his venues) was impressed with the fact that King had placed into the terms of the contract for the Tyson-Douglas fight that he was essentially going to be Douglas’ promoter if he was to win (thus landing into a win-win scenario, no matter who won the fight). In this manner, King was able to expand his stable of promotable fighters by taking hold of a title belt (the WBC being chronicled as his closest allies in this regard, as seen in the story of the WBC stripping Leon Spinks of his belt to give Muhammad Ali a rematch for the World Heavyweight Championship, splitting the sanctioning belts and the lineal claim) and forcing anyone that wanted a shot to work under him and under his rules, making himself wealthier by the fight. In virtually any other industry, this would be condemned as being monopolistic (and the 2000 Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act does in fact ban these types of options officially). Of course, King wasn’t the first to do so, as ‘Uncle’ Mike Jacobs, the legendary 30s and 40s Boxing promoter was able to secure 5 of the 8 titles through a ‘Carnival of Champions’ card where he ended up having the Bantamweight, Lightweight, Welterweight, Middleweight (claimant) & Heavyweight champions by virtue of his own options that he would force contenders to sign in order to face his fighters.

Of course, unlike the Boxing industry, where the Boxers are essentially free agents who have to negotiate with other fighters and promoters in order to get a quality fight placed on TV or PPV (or to get a title shot), MMA is structured more like Pro Wrestling (for the last 20 or so years) in that there has been an establishment of exclusive contracts for fighters (at least in the bigger organizations such as UFC, PRIDE, IFL & HERO*S) and that each organization promotes their own set of fighters as champion rather than either a single recognized champion or even a set of sanctioning bodies being involved. The ‘option’ itself does not exist as it does in Boxing as the promoter of a fighter’s bouts has them (often for the long haul) in a single organization rather than in the big picture. Of course, this exclusivity clause that prevent fighters from trying to make extra money fighting more often in other organizations, but unlike an option clause that a Don King would employ, the promoter in MMA cannot change around the contracted salary at his whim in order to try and maximize his profit making.

Finally, there is the matter of training and living expenses. In the Boxing world, Don King became notorious for shortchanging fighters from their purses even further than signing essentially illegal managerial deals for 50% of their purses by having training expenses tagged on as bills for fighters (even when the fighters already paid the expenses or the original contract said King would cover the expenses). For example, in the case of Tim Witherspoon, there is a picture on page 236 of Don King’s numerous deductions, including a charge for $28,000 for training camp usage, even though it should have been $2,800 as the sheet lists 28 days at $100. In addition, there were claims made in the book that Witherspoon was charged for ‘loans’ which were really training expenses that King was obligated to cover (pay back to Witherspoon) and he was forced to pay for his own trainer rather than King. In addition, Witherspoon was forced to pay taxes at the base rate of the initial purse he was due rather than at a deducted rate given the deductions he had to pay (probably because King’s reason for pulling off these deductions from the papers he filed was to prevent anyone from finding out his strange deductions during a tax audit), leaving him with almost nothing.

Generally in MMA, however, the atmosphere is a bit different as the organization (UFC, PRIDE, etc.) isn’t acting as a pseudo-manager (or manager by agent as in King’s case) to the fighters and so the fighters generally will be in their own training stable (MFS, BTT, Golden Glory, Lions Den, etc.) to prepare for fights and try to limit those types of expenses. Whereas in Boxing trainers tend to be more nomadic with them sticking with a few guys here and there for the long haul, in MMA the trainers tend to create their own group of fighters that will work with, through thick and then. As such, while the trainers will get a fee for their services, they tend to maintain closer relationships with their fighters and are not simply the best guy for the money that the manager wanted to pay, thus lacking a real bond or understanding between the parties.

So, in the end, what does all of this mean in the context of Heath Herring accepting a seemingly paltry $6,000 with a $6,000 win bonus for his debut in the UFC after all of his experience in PRIDE and HERO*S (as well as overall in MMA)? Herring probably believed that even if he was getting shortchanged in terms of his first few purses, he would garner some good sponsors and TV exposure in the US so that he could either command a higher salary in the organization when it came time to renegotiate the contract or could get fights in smaller organizations elsewhere for higher purses. Unfortunately for him, the gamble did not pay off and he ended up losing a pretty one sided decision to Jake O’Brien, which probably will stifle his chances of getting big money unless he turns things around fast (which is unlikely, but you can never say never in combat sports).

While wrapping things up, I just wanted to bring up a nice clarification document issued by the NSAC with regards to their MMA rules. 

Addendum: As noted by AS below in the comments and the Wrestling Observer Newsletter, Heath Herring actually received $60,000, a significant amount above the initially reported $6,000 and a more reasonable purse given his experience level. Nonetheless, the premise of the article (that fighters are willing to take pay cuts for future dividends in name recognition, sponsorships, higher future contracts, etc.) still stands and you can easily replace Herring with someone like Sean Salmon to get the point across on why fighters are willing to take almost non-existent salaries in the big organizations.

Topics: All Topics, Boxing, MMA, PRIDE, Tomer Chen, UFC | 12 Comments » | Permalink | Trackback |

12 Responses to “Purses or: How the fighters get paid”

  1. Lynchman says:

    Excellent! Long, but excellent!

  2. AS says:

    This weeks Observer says that Herring got $60,000, not $6,000, under the terms of the WFA contract that the UFC picked up.

  3. I want to second what Lynchman said: Very good and informative article!

  4. Tomer Chen says:

    This weeks Observer says that Herring got $60,000, not $6,000, under the terms of the WFA contract that the UFC picked up.

    Thanks for the correction/catch, AS; much appreciated. Added an addendum at the end to clarify on your corrective point.

  5. The MMA Critic says:

    I still find it comical that people follow what the NSAC releases. Those numbers are often so far from the truth that they aren’t even a starting point of discussion.

    Fighting for the UFC is like going to college. Yes, if you don’t go to college, there is still a chance that you will be successful. However, the chances are slimmer. On average, a UFC fighter will be paid more over his entire career due to sponsors and various other reasons.

    Look at a guy like Nick Diaz. His UFC exposure has given him solid paydays outside of the UFC now. If he had the same record (against the same people) all outside of the UFC, he wouldn’t be getting paid half of what he is now.

  6. Tomer Chen says:

    MMA Critic:

    Not sure if you were pointing at me, but that’s exactly the purpose of my article: that the initial salaries listed by the NSAC are pretty much misleading on their own and that there are other forms of compensation (sponsorship cash, name recognition, etc.) that need to be factored in to truly value what the fighter is getting out of the UFC (or PRIDE, K-1 HERO*S or any other organization that carries any real negotiating power behind it). This article was more a response to the constant battering that I see on many forums (predominantly Sherdog) where the posters tend to bash Dana White and the UFC for being ‘monsters’ or ‘assholes’ for giving $5,000 to a fighter as a base when, really, the fighters themselves are gambling to see if they can win and increase their future salaries as well as build a name for themselves so they can potentially go elsewhere and make a great payoff. In the end, both parties benefit: the UFC gets to save salary expenses by paying less than the fighters may theoretically be worth if they truly negotiated to the last penny in most cases and the fighters get to call themselves “UFC veterans” when fighting in the IFL, PRIDE, etc. (as you mentioned with Nick Diaz), thus raising their bargaining base (unless they are a Tiki Ghosn or Patrick Cote who lost the vast majority if not all their bouts, of course; after all, wins and losses do mean something in the end).

  7. The MMA Critic says:

    I completely agree with your article.

    If I am a young fighter, and I had to sign a 3 fight contract with a company, I would do it with the UFC. If Bodog offered me $15k a fight, and the UFC offered me $5k, it wouldn’t even be a contest. Unless your name is Matt Lindland or Frank Shamrock, fighting out of the big show does not financially make sense.

    It is sad when you hear a fighter like Paul Buentello admit that he took an offer from Strikeforce that was only a tiny bit more then what the UFC offered. He should have fired his manager on the spot for even suggesting it.

    I think a lot of these fans online don’t put anything into perspective. They are the same kids out of high school that brag about making $35,000 a year while the college kids are completely broke out of college. Yet when that college kid gets out of college, he still might only be getting paid $30,000. Yet in 5 years, that high school student is still making $35k, and now the college student is making $50k, plus bonuses and stock options. And then in 15 years, that college student is now making $75,000, and the high school kid got laid off a few times and is now only making $25,000.

    ——-

    Plus, fans often forget that the UFC has a right to underpay these fighters slightly. It sounds stupid, but think about it for a moment. The UFC is giving these 23 or 24 year old fighters the exposure of their life. That exposure if worth a pay cut. Consider the pay cut like buying advertising dollars for your product. You lose money in the short term, but hopefully enough people buy your product (the fighter) and you make more money in the longrun.

    Tyson Griffin could of had that same fight with Frank Edgar at a KOTC show, and his pay potential would have gone down because he lost. Yet, because he lost like that on a UFC PPV, his value just went up. The fans got to see that he was a warrior, even in defeat. The fans are going to love to see him back in there. And then when a fighter starts to prove himself, the UFC easily takes care of them. The proof is there. They did that with Cro Cop. They did that with the new contract for GSP. He was being underpaid when he won the title. And now he will be well compensated for at least the next 2 years. It paid off in the end.

  8. Tomer Chen says:

    Plus, in the cases of guys like Lindland and Shamrock who can pick where they’re fighting for good pay, they established themselves before in the UFC (Shamrock in Pancrase as well, though everyone calls him the former UFC Middleweight/Light Heavyweight Champion), so really they are in effect riding their “UFC veteran” coattails to get more money (which is great, really). In essence, brand name association is the game when it comes to commanding better money in the future (such as being a “UFC veteran”), just like graduating from college (especially a higher end one such as Harvard or Yale) is expected to give you future dividends in a high ceiling job (such as an analytical job at Goldman Sachs, where the mean bonus was $622,000 for the year (although, of course, the actual compensation was based on experience and achievements – nonetheless, a staggering amount)). Or in my case, where spending nearly $1,200 and 10 months of intense (daily) studying for the CFA Level I examination allowed me to add on the fact that I passed the extremely challenging exam on my resume, making me look better to prospective future employers (and graduate schools). The Net Present Value of my investment into the CFA Level I exam is positive, just like taking a pay cut in the UFC for the exposure is expected to be a positive experience, on the whole.

    Certainly, there are levels of abuse in MMA and Boxing (more so in Boxing due to the sanctioning body and promoter format rather than organizational format as I detailed in the article above), just like there is anywhere in the business world (I wasn’t exactly making boatloads more money out of college than most High School graduate jobs gave, but that had to do with lack of experience in the real world), but in the end, if you play your cards right, you can very well become successful.

  9. Croatian Strength says:

    “It is sad when you hear a fighter like Paul Buentello admit that he took an offer from Strikeforce that was only a tiny bit more then what the UFC offered. He should have fired his manager on the spot for even suggesting it.”

    I remember reading an interview and he wanted to stay in the UFC but his contract wasn’t renewed by them.

  10. fightopinionReader says:

    Makes you wonder if Brandon Vera is doing the right thing by looking to leave the UFC for greener pastures. Compare the temporary benefits of leaving now versus the long term benefits of becoming a UFC champion.

  11. Zack says:

    If the $1.5 mil signing bonus for Vera, which Meltzer reported, is anywhere close to true…he’s making the right decision.

    Does anyone else remember when K-1 reported for one of their American shows that Gary Goodridge got paid $500? That was the most absurd thing payday-wise that I remember seeing.

  12. Paul says:

    Great Read – thank you.

    “I still find it comical that people follow what the NSAC releases. Those numbers are often so far from the truth that they aren’t even a starting point of discussion.”

    ^ Couldn’t agree more with that comment though.

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